Our airport's expansion now costs twice as much and will finish four years late.

In 2021 the people you elect to the County Commission, sitting as the airport's board, approved a project to join RSW's three concourses behind one new security checkpoint. Two years in, the builder found the structure had been designed wrong. Here is what happened, who decided, who pays, and what it's doing to the price of flying out of Fort Myers.

This page follows the public record: the Port Authority's meeting minutes, its audited financial statements, its budgets, and the county's annual report. Where a detail comes only from news coverage, it says so.

The short version: an approved $331.6 million project became a $678.3 million one, the new checkpoint that was due before Thanksgiving 2024 is now on a contract running to 2029, and what airlines pay to use RSW has gone from among the lowest in Florida in 2024 to the second highest in 2025.

Port Authority
The county agency that runs RSW and Page Field. Its board is the County Commission.
Phase 1
The project that joins the concourses and builds one large checkpoint. The one that went over budget.
Engineer of record
The firm whose engineers sign off that the design is safe and correct.
Cost per passenger
What airlines pay the airport, on average, for each passenger who boards there. Not a ticket price.

01Who's in charge

Your County Commissioners are also the Port Commissioners.

There's no separate airport board to vote for. The same five commissioners who set your county budget also sit as the Board of Port Commissioners, which governs the Lee County Port Authority. That board hires the airport's executive director and approves every Phase 1 budget, contract and extension.

You elect

Five Lee County Commissioners

Hat one

Board of County Commissioners

County budget, roads, zoning, property tax.

Hat two

Board of Port Commissioners

Runs RSW and Page Field. Approves every Phase 1 budget and contract.

Which hires

The airport's Executive Director and staff

Who hire the firms that design, build and check the work. Tap one:

AtkinsRealis · Designer

The job
Engineer of record: the firm whose engineers sign off that the structure is safe and correct.
How it was hired
Ranked first for the terminal design in 2016. Florida law has engineers picked on qualifications, with the fee negotiated afterwards, so there was no price competition at selection.
After the error
Kept on Phase 1 and on the next, larger expansion (Concourse E). Gave a $3.3 million credit 'in good faith'. Its Phase 1 contract was extended in March 2025, and the legal deadline for claims against it was paused in May 2025. No settlement appears in the minutes through September 2026.

Source: M-160630, M-240516, M-250324, M-250508

An airport board is one of the least-watched jobs a county commissioner has. On the day this board doubled the budget, one member of the public spoke.

So what did that board approve in 2021?

02The plan

One checkpoint instead of three, done by early 2025.

In September 2021 the board approved a plan to join RSW's three concourses and move all security screening into one new 14-lane checkpoint. The budget was $331.6 million. Construction would start that fall and finish in early 2025, with the new checkpoint targeted before Thanksgiving 2024.

Concourse 1Concourse 2Concourse 3Each concourse has its own security line. Airside, they don't connect.New connector: concourses joined airsideOne checkpoint: 14 lanes, room for 2 moreTicketing and baggage claim (landside)
A schematic, not to scale. Phase 1 covers 282,385 sq ft: 117,580 new and 164,805 remodeled, with more gate seating, new concessions, TSA and airport offices and a business lounge (minutes, 21 Sept 2021). The three existing checkpoints stay open throughout construction.

A sensible goal: one line instead of three, and a connected terminal behind it. Nothing on this page argues against the idea. It's about how it was built and who answered for it.

Construction started in fall 2021. By January 2023, staff told the board it was already behind schedule. Then it got worse.

03What went wrong

Two years into construction, they found a major problem with the design.

In September 2023 the builder, Manhattan Construction, found errors in the structural design: the plans for what holds the building up. An outside review it paid for listed 18 major design deficiencies.

According to the airport's executive director, as reported by the press, the steel columns had been designed for 110 mph winds. The building code required 167. Manhattan said the roof could collapse in a Category 5 hurricane. In Lee County, hurricane winds are not a hypothetical. Try it:

Category 4 hurricane

Designed for110Code167
12345

150 mph: beyond what the columns were designed for

That's 40 mph past the original column rating. The building code called for 167.

The 110 and 167 mph figures were given by the airport's Executive Director at the 24 March 2025 meeting, as reported by Gulfshore Business; the minutes say only "errors in the structural design". 167 mph is a design wind speed under the building code; Category 5 begins at 157 mph sustained, so the two are different measures. Hurricane Ian came ashore in Lee County in 2022 at about 150 mph (National Hurricane Center).

The airport's own audited statement put it plainly: the original budget was "significantly undervalued due to the design errors." Commissioner Hamman called it "a catastrophic mistake made by the engineer of record."

Fixing it meant going back into a building that was already up.

04The fix

Fixing it meant tearing out what was already built.

The repair plan strengthens 80 columns with carbon fiber and tears out and rebuilds some concrete walls and beams. The first 12 to 15 months of the restarted schedule were demolition. As reported, the redesign added 440 tons of steel and reworked nearly 2,000 fabricated parts.

About 1 in 5 steel parts redesigned

1,982 of 9,154 fabricated parts. Each square is about 100.

A quarter more steel

440 new tons on top of 1,693 (+26%).

  • 80 columns wrapped in carbon fiber to strengthen them
  • 66 existing trusses to modify
  • Concrete walls and beams torn out and rebuilt
Columns, walls and beams: the minutes of 24 March 2025. Steel tonnage, parts and trusses: the Executive Director at that meeting, as reported by Gulfshore Business.

This is the expensive kind of mistake: one found after the steel is fabricated and standing, not on paper.

05Not only the designer

The builder made a mistake too.

In October 2023, a month after it flagged the design, Manhattan drilled into the reinforcing steel inside a concrete beam, according to Commissioner Mulicka. Manhattan wrote itself up for it. In February 2025 it was still unresolved.

The two firms traded letters; an executive at the designer replied that he was "gobsmacked." The airport told reporters all its buildings are safe.

Source: WGCU News, 21 Feb 2025 (press report).

“I'd say this whole thing is a terrible mess.”

Commissioner David Mulicka, February 2025 (WGCU)

06The wait

The board was told 60 days. It took 15 months.

Commissioner Greenwell said the board was first told a fix plan would take 60 days, then 90. It took about 15 months. Staff said the redesign "took longer than expected."

When the plan and its price finally reached the board in January 2025, commissioners balked and deferred it. While they weighed it, keeping the builder's contract going cost about $4 million a month.

  • First told60 days
  • Then told90 days
  • What it tookabout 15 months
Commissioner Greenwell at the 24 March 2025 meeting (minutes paraphrase). The Executive Director replied that the redesign "took longer than expected." Fifteen months drawn as about 456 days.

Put every date on one line and the schedule tells the story.

07The schedule

The finish line moved four years.

The plan was a three-year build. The builder's contract now runs to 31 March 2029. Tap any point on the line to read what the record says happened.

202120222023202420252026202720282029The plan, 2021The schedule nowtoday+4 years

Sept 2023

The builder finds the design errors

Manhattan Construction discovers errors in the structural design. An outside review it paid for later lists 18 major design deficiencies.

Source: M-250324 · 3 of 13

  • Plan / milestone
  • Problem
  • Board decision
  • Money

The single checkpoint, the whole point of Phase 1, was supposed to open before Thanksgiving 2024. It is now on a contract that ends in 2029.

Four more years of a construction crew, a construction manager and inspectors is not free.

08The bill

The board doubled the budget.

On 24 March 2025 the board added $346.8 million, bringing Phase 1 to $678.3 million. It carried with no nays recorded. Commissioner Mulicka tied his motion to new oversight: staff changes, monthly reports from the firms, and notice whenever more than $100,000 of contingency is spent.

The increase is the most the airport may spend, not money already gone. It covers the demolition and rework, 44 more months of construction management, extended inspection, and reserve money the airport holds. No document splits out how much is the design error alone.

  • January 2021 estimate · Jan 2021$263.0M

  • Budget approved · Sept 2021$331.6M

  • Budget after the reset · Mar 2025$678.3M

The dashed line inside the last bar marks the 2021 budget. Sources: M-210121W, M-210921, M-251106W. Staff describe the new figure as "adjusted from $331 million to $678.3 million"; $331,586,401 + $346,792,083 = $678,378,484.

June 2026: the money is running ahead of the clock

  • Construction budget billed77%

  • Schedule complete72%

$424.8 million billed of a $588.9 million construction budget. LCPA Capital Projects Report, July 2026 (CPR-2607). The construction budget is smaller than the $678.3 million total project budget; the report doesn't explain the difference.

The airport chose to keep the same designer, builder and inspector. Staff said starting over would cost about $500 million and take six to seven years.

09Who pays

No property tax pays for it. That doesn't make it free.

Officials have said on the record that "none of the money spent at the airport comes from taxpayers." That holds for local taxes: the airport's bonds are backed only by airport income.

But about 12% of Phase 1 is Florida DOT grants, which is state tax money. Another 23% is passenger facility charges, a fee on every ticket. And the biggest share is borrowed against what airlines, rental car companies and parking pay the airport. Tap a slice:

Airport revenue bonds$441.2 million · 65%

Borrowed from investors and repaid over decades out of airport income: what airlines, rental car companies, parking and concessions pay the airport. Backed only by that income, not by county property tax.

LCPA's Phase 1 funding plan, presented to the Lee MPO on 17 October 2025 (MPO-251017); total $678.4 million. The July 2026 Capital Projects Report repeats the percentages.

Most of this is borrowed. Which brings us to the airport's debt.

10The debt

The airport's debt more than doubled in one year.

Airport bonds outstanding went from about $374 million in September 2024 to $880.7 million in September 2025. Most of that increase paid for Concourse E, a separate, larger expansion. Then in March 2026 the airport sold $634 million more. About $250 million of that is for Phase 1.

Before the 2026 sale, the airport already owed $1.65 billion in principal and interest, with payments running to 2055.

About $250 million of them is for Phase 1.
$0$400M$800M$1.2B$1.6B$374.1MSept 2024$880.7MSept 2025
Airport revenue bonds outstanding at the end of each fiscal year (FY2025 audited statement). The September 2024 figure is derived: $880.73M less the $506.67M one-year increase. March 2026 bonds: 2026A-1 $464.1M and 2026A-2 $169.9M. Most of the 2025 increase paid for Concourse E, a separate expansion.

A thinner cushion

The bonds require the airport's net income to cover its yearly loan payments at least 1.25 times. It still does, at 1.97, the lowest since 2020.

0×1×2×3×Bond minimum: 1.25×20162017201820192020202120222023202420251.97× in FY2025
How many times over the airport's net income covers its yearly loan payments (Lee County FY2025 ACFR). FY2025 includes the Concourse E bonds, not the Phase 1 bonds sold in March 2026.

Rating agencies kept the airport's A ratings for the 2026 bonds, and analysts called the debt 'above average' but 'manageable'. But the cushion over yearly payments is thinner than it was, and it doesn't yet include the Phase 1 bonds.

11What airlines pay

Airlines now pay more at RSW than at Tampa or Orlando.

For years RSW sat mid-pack among Florida's eight commercial airports, and in 2024 it was the 3rd cheapest. A year later it was the 2nd most expensive, behind only Miami. Its figure rose 111% in one year, the biggest jump of the eight.

Press play, or drag through the years.

FY2025

RSW was the 2nd most expensive of 8 Florida airports for airlines.

  1. RSW$13.05
  2. Tampa$12.78
  3. Orlando$12.56
  4. Ft. Lauderdale$9.47
  5. Palm Beach$1.89
  6. Sarasota$7.80
  7. Jacksonville$10.25
  8. Miami$17.62
What airlines pay the airport per departing passenger: FAA CATS filings (Form 5100-127), passenger-airline revenue divided by enplanements, compiled by DWU Consulting. The same measure for every airport, so the comparison is like-for-like; it runs higher than each airport's own net figure. Palm Beach has no FY2009-10 data. Its very low FY2025 figure reflects its own revenue sharing.

Be precise about the cause. The airport attributes the 2025 jump mainly to Concourse E debt under a new airline agreement, and the 2025 rate was set before the Phase 1 increase was approved. The Phase 1 overrun bonds were sold in March 2026, so they reach airline rates from 2026 on. Both expansions are paid from the same airport.

And the airport's own forecast keeps climbing.

12The airport's own number

The airport's goal was $8.50. It's proposing $16.64.

In 2021 the airport's stated objective was "maintaining a competitive" cost per passenger of $8.50 or less. Its adopted budget for this year and its proposed budget for next are both well past it. Terminal rent per square foot for airlines is proposed to go from $218.54 to $287.39.

The airport's own 2021 goal: $8.50 or less
$4.75
$11.94
$14.03
$16.64
'15'16'17'18'19'21'22'23'24'25'26'27
The airport's own cost per enplaned passenger, net of revenue sharing and refunds (audited statements FY2015-FY2025; FY2026 adopted and FY2027 proposed budgets, dashed). FY2020 is not in the records held. The $8.50 objective is from 2021. FY2024's low figure was held down by $5.1 million of airline refunds and $10.7 million of revenue sharing.

13Why it matters to you

Bigger construction bills can mean bigger airline fees.

Airlines pay the airport to use RSW. Here is how a construction overrun travels from a budget vote to an airline's costs, with each link marked by how firmly the record shows it.

  1. In the record

    The build costs more

    Phase 1 went from $331.6 million to $678.3 million.

  2. In the record

    The airport borrows

    About two-thirds of Phase 1 is airport revenue bonds. About $250 million of the March 2026 bonds is for Phase 1.

  3. In the record

    Yearly loan payments rise

    Debt payments were projected at about $75 million in 2026, up 14.88%.

  4. Contract term

    Airline rates must cover them

    The airline agreement guarantees net revenue of 140% of debt payments. If it falls short, rates 'may be increased at the sole discretion of the Port Authority'.

  5. Our reasoning

    Airlines set fares

    Airlines usually pass airport costs on in ticket prices. Fares also depend on competition, and the record shows no airline citing RSW's rates.

Sources: M-251106W; MPO-251017; M-260115R; M-250508W; FY2025 audited statement (airline agreement from 1 October 2024).

When airlines pay more, who do you think they charge?

14At the terminal

Meanwhile, passengers wait.

The cost of a late project isn't only in the budget. It's in the terminal, every day the construction runs.

  • Three security lines, not one

    The three old checkpoints stay open throughout construction. A temporary TSA checkpoint was scheduled for February 2026.

    Source: M-250324, M-251106W

  • Food before security: two Dunkin's

    Phase 1 closed main-terminal concessions in April 2025 and February 2026. Pre-security food is down to two Dunkin' locations and a grab-and-go kiosk.

    Source: WGCU, 16 Apr 2025 and 28 Jan 2026

  • Detours and parking

    Staff described detours through construction areas, and warned in May 2026 'there may come a time when there is no available parking' during the parking expansion.

    Source: M-230119W, M-260507W

  • The first new space, in 2026

    In May 2026 the executive director called 7,700 sq ft of TSA offices 'the first net-new space in Phase 1'.

    Source: M-260507

15Still open

Three years later, we still don't know…

These are questions the public record doesn't answer yet. Each one is answerable, by a vote, an audit or a records release.

  1. 1

    How much of the $346.8 million is the design error?

    No document splits it into design error, delay, inflation or scope.

  2. 2

    What will the designer pay?

    Beyond the $3.3 million credit, no claim amount or settlement appears. The legal deadline has been paused since May 2025.

  3. 3

    What did the reviews find?

    Neither the builder's outside peer review (TRC) nor the airport's own Parsons reports is public. Parsons' were held for legal review.

  4. 4

    Where is the audit?

    The Clerk's Inspector General listed a Phase 1 audit in its 2025 plan and carried it into 2026. No report has been released.

  5. 5

    When was the board first told?

    The design error was found in September 2023. Its first explicit mention in the minutes is May 2024.

  6. 6

    What changed in the airport's engineering department?

    Staff reported 'significant changes' in November 2025. The minutes don't say what they were. No firing appears in the record.

The campaign's read

The board that approved it is the board overseeing the fix. So the public has to be the check.

Design errors happen. What turns one into a doubled budget and a four-year delay is a board that first takes it up in public eight months later, waits on 60-day promises for 15 months, keeps the same designer and inspector on the next, bigger project, and keeps the reviews out of public view.

I'd start with three things: release the Parsons and peer-review reports, finish the Inspector General's audit, and report to the public, in plain language, what the airport is recovering from the firms responsible. People who fly out of RSW are paying for this. They should be able to see the receipts.